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1.0 INTRODUCTION
This report assesses the performance of the 360H005, Fifth Flight, Rede-
signed Solid Rocket Motors (RSRM) in respect to joint sealing issues as
seen from post-fllght inspection of the seals and sealing surfaces. The
factory joint disassembly inspections have resumed for 360H005. The new
factory joint grease application is in effect and now can be assessed
during the disassembly process.
Figure 1 illustrates the RSRM consisting of capture feature field joints
with the J-joint insulation configuration (see Figure 2). Figure 3
illustrates the nozzle-to-case joint design, which includes 100, 7/8-inch
radial bolts in conjunction with a wiper O-ring and modified insulation
design.
The ignition system seals and a cross section of the igniter are illus-
trated in Figures 4 and 5. Figures 6 through 10 show the configuration of
all the internal nozzle joints.
REVISION
_c,oTVR-17544
SEC
I PAGE 1
_ CORPORA T,'O_,
__JC5 __-'_--=Jr:Ob'5
1110 deql
270 + 90dq deq
0 deg
AN Lookkng
Fowwefd
REVISION
RSRM
Figure 1
Motor Configuration
DOC NO,
T_/R-175_A
I VOL
r
IV
o__ SEC PAGE 2
_"_ CORPORA T/O "v'
S_4 CE C---=__ 7,'0_,'S
GAP
PRESSURIZATION SLOT--- 7
/
i
CASTABLE INHIBITOR /PROPELLANT STRESS
RELJEF FLAP
LINER
Y
!
J-LEG
LINER
FORWARD FACING
NBR INHIBITOR
CARBON FIBER
FILLED EDPM
ASBESTOS-
SILICA-FILLED
NBR
CAPTURE
FEATURE
O-RING
SECONDARY
O-RING
CAPTURE
FEATURE
JOINT ADHESIVE BONDLINE
(IN INCHES)
ASBESTOS-
SILICA-FILLED
NBR
V2 VOLUME
FILLER
PRIMARY
O-RING
TANG
VENT PORT
PLUG (13S')
LEAK CHECK
PORTS (45")
I I
I I
I I
CUSTOM SHIMS
PINS
CLEVIS
PiN RETAINER BAND
REVISION
Figure 2
RSRM Assembled Field Joint
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Nozzle-to-Case Joint
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Igniter Cross Section
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Exit Cone-to-Aft Exit Cone Joint
TWR-1754&
DOC NO.
IV
" VOL
s,¢ IpA°' 7
_--_/_ C O,R P O R A T/ON
SP4 CE OPE_,_ TIO,VS
Per MS33649-0!
0,295 Secondary O-ri --_.j
/ Carbon _ __"--__
c_,_oo__! -
._/S_
RTV Applied
Before Assembly
Pir_
REVISION
Figure 7
Nose Inlet Housing-to-Throat Support
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Housing-to-Throat Support
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Housing-to-Forward Exit Cone Joint
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2.0 sIn4MARY
2.1 Post-Fllght Inspection Summary
The post-flight inspection of both motors shoved the seal components to be
in excellent condition except for the indentation found on the inner
primary seal of the right hand inner igniter gasket, aft face (see Figure
11). Detailed inspection results, and inspections performed by the O-ring
Inspection Team can be found in Section 5.0 of this report.
The Component Program Teams (CPT) have identified twelve observations, made
during disassembly inspections, as "potential anomalies." The twelve
potential anomalies were further classified as two remains observations,
nine minor anomalies, and one major anomaly. These classifications are
further discussed in Section 5.4.
There was no evidence of hot gas or soot past the J-seal on the six field
joints or past the polysulflde on the two nozzle-to-case joints. The
igniter joints showed no hot gas or soot past the primary seals. There was
no soot to the aft exit cone primaries and there was no evidence of soot or
hot gas past the primary seals on any of the internal nozzle joints.
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There was light surface corrosion on the outer clevis leg on all the field
joints, no corrosion was found on any sealing surfaces. Intermittent
aluminum corrosion (A1203) was found between the primary and secondary
seals on the right aft exlt cone joint. Overall the grease application to
all field and nozzle-to-case joints was nominal.
3.0 O-RING SQUEEZE AND LEAK CHECK RESULTS
Calculations for the 360H005 O-ring squeeze are given in TWR-18761 (see
Reference I). The results of the leak check of the 360H005 boosters are
addressed in detail in TWR-18798 (see Reference 2).
4..0 STRUCTURAL ASSESSHENT
This section normally details the structural assessment of the case field
joints, factory joints, nozzle-to-case joint, and case metal components
with comparisons to the flight envelopes and previous flights. However,
there was no Development Flight Instrumentation (DFI) installed on this
flight set, therefore, no structural assessment is made in this report.
5.0 POST-FLXGHT INSPECTION RESULTS
Joints and Seals Design Engineering performed a post-flight evaluation of
the 360H005 forward, center, and aft field joints, aft exit cone field
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joints, nozzle-to-case joints, the igniter, and safe and arm joints at Han-
gar A-F, Kennedy Space Center (KSC), Florida. The internal nozzles, S&As,
and factory joints were disassembled and inspected at the H-5 and H-7
refurbishment facility in Clearfield, Utah. The objective of this section
is to document the post-flight condition of the 360B005 plugs, sealing
surfaces and seals as noted during disassembly, and to discuss all
observations assessed by the Seal Component Team.
In an attempt to standardize and document the evaluation of flight motors,
a standard evaluation plan has been written (see References 3 and 4).
Appropriate procedures contained in this plan were used to evaluate the
sealing system of all joints contained in the RSRM. The intent of this
plan is to ensure that all pertinent evaluation points of 360H005 are
examined and documented in a consistent and complete manner.
The left motor will be discussed first, then the right motor. The evalua-
tion will start at the igniter and proceed down the motors to the aft exit
cones. The following guidelines have been established to classify O-ring,
gasket, Stat-O-Seal and corrosion damage found from post-flight/test
inspections. These guidelines were established so that each inspection
data base will be consistent and not be confusing or misleading. Some of
these definitions are used in this document.
O-RINGS , CASKETS AND STAT-O-SEALS
Cut: Width, essentially zero (have to
open up to find the damage), and
depth greater than 0.005 inch.
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Scratch:
Nick:
Gouge:
Circumferential
or Radial Flowline:
(i) Closed:
Width less than 0.005 inch and
depth less than 0.005 inch.
Width less than 0.020 inch, but
greater than 0.005 inch; and depth
less than 0.010 inch, but greater
than 0.005 inch.
Width greater than 0.020 inch and
depth greater than 0.010 inch.
Visible evidence of incomplete flow
or knit of the material.
Tightly adhered, not separable,
does not open when lightly probed.
(ii) Separable:
(iii) Open:
Visually appears closed.
when lightly probed.
Obvious separation or gap.
Separates
Hard Inclusion:
Porosity/Soft Inclusion:
Extrusion Damage:
Heat Effect:
Erosion:
CORROSION
Light Corrosion:
Medium Corrosion:
Foreign material enclosed in the
seal material.
An air pocket enclosed in the seal
material.
Seal material pinched and/or cut
due to an overfill condition.
Glossy and/or hardened seal surface
due to hot gas impingement.
Seal material missing due to hot
gas impingement or blow by.
can be wiped off by hand. Surface
discoloration.
Can not be wiped off by hand
without the use of a Scotch-Brite
material, methyl chloroform, or
grease soaked rag.
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Heavy Corrosion: Starting to penetrate into the
metal surface such that pitting
and/or metal material is
significantly eroded.
5.1 Left Motor DisasseRbl 7 Evaluation
There were no critical observations found on the left motor.
5.1.1 External Walk Around
The external walk around inspection revealed no signs of hot gas leakage
past any joints.
5.1.2 Safe and Arm Joint
Soot was observed on the inboard edge of the gasket the full circumference.
There was no soot to the primary seal. Moisture was found inboard of the
primary seal on the igniter adapter S&A boss. No corrosion
Inspection
inspection
damage.
of the gasket at disassembly revealed no damage.
of the gasket by the O-ring inspection team also
was noted.
Detailed
revealed no
Detailed inspection of the S&A upon disassembly revealed the primary and
secondary O-rings of the rotor shaft were in good condition, with no
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evidence of blow-by or heat effects found. The secondary O-rings were also
in good condition with no evidence of damage found.
Inspection of the barrier booster (B-B) rotor shaft housing bore revealed
one circumferential and two axial scratches that could be felt using a 5
and I0 mll piece of brass shlm stock. The scratches were on the primary and
secondary sealing surface similar In footprint to those found on Fourth
Flight. It was determined that these scratches were caused by the bore
micrometer used to measure the bore diameters prior to assembly.
Inspection of the S&A to Adapter leak check port plug (306 degrees)
revealed lint contamination underneath the O-ring. The contamination was
probably introduced at assembly. Grease application appeared to be
slightly heavy on the B-B rotor leak check plug (126 degrees).
The initiators were removed from the B-B and inspected. No evidence of
blow-by was found past the threads. The primary sealing surface of each
initiator was inspected for threads protruding into the sealing region.
None were noted. One small deformation was noted on each of the sealing
washers of the two initiators. This washer forms the sealing surface of
the secondary O-ring.
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5.1.3 Outer Igniter Joint (Adapter-to-Forvard Dome)
A blow path through the zinc chromate putty was present at 105 degrees.
The jet was approximately 0.35 inch wide through the entire length. Soot
was noted to the primary seal on the forward face from 130 to 140 degrees.
Heavy soot was observed from i00 to 140 degrees on the forward face of the
metal retainer. No soot was present past the primary seal and no heat
affect was indicated on the gasket.
Light corrosion was found on the inner edge of the gasket intermittently
the entire circumference and most notably at the blowhole location.
5.1.4 Inner Igniter Joint (Adapter-to-Chamber)
No soot or damage was observed on the gasket seals. No corrosion was found
on the gasket or joint metal surface. All stat-o-seals from the inner
joint bolts had typical disassembly damage.
There was heavy soot on the end of special bolts, and light soot to the
primary seal of the special bolt removed from 100 degrees.
Inspection of the OPTs (operational pressure transducers) located at 40,
180, and 270 degrees showed soot deposits up to but not past the primary
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seals.
degrees
seals.
Inspection of the special bolt and IPT plugs located at 100 and 115
respectively showed soot deposits up to but not past the primary
No anomalous conditions were noted on the seals or plugs.
5.1.5 Forvard Field Joint
There was no sign of hot gas or soot past the J-leg. The grease coverage
was per design and no corrosion was found on any sealing surface. The
outer diameter of the outer clevis leg showed intermittent light surface
corrosion from zero to 360 degrees on the one inch unpainted surface. The
joint was heavily contaminated with debris from hydrolaze operations, which
is used to remove the joint protection system.
No seal damage was observed at the time of disassembly, and the V2 filler
was properly installed with no visible damage. Detailed inspection of the
large diameter O-rlngs revealed no damage to primary or secondary. Two
very light circumferential scratches were found on the capture feature
O-ring at 290.4 and 306.1 degrees. The worst case scratch at 306.1 degrees
measured 12.5 inches long, 0.001 inch wide and an indeterminable depth.
5.1.6 Center Field Joint
There was no sign of hot gas or soot past the J-leg. The grease coverage
was per design and no corrosion was found on any sealing surface. No
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corrosion was found on any of the joint interior surfaces. The outside
diameter of the outer clevis leg showed light intermittent corrosion from
zero to 360 degrees on the one inch unpainted surface. The joint was
contaminated with debris from hydrolaze operations. No seal damage was
observed on the primary or secondary O-rings at the time of disassembly.
The V2 filler was properly installed and no visible damage was found.
Detailed inspection of the large diameter O-rings revealed no damages.
5.1.7 Aft Field Joint
There was no sign of hot gas or soot past the J-joint. The grease coverage
was per design and no corrosion was found on any sealing surfaces. The
outside diameter of the outer clevis leg showed light intermittent
corrosion from zero to 360 degrees on the one inch unpainted surface. The
joint was contaminated with debris and water from hydrolaze operations. No
seal damage was observed at the tlme of disassembly and the V2 filler was
properly installed wlth no visible damage. Detailed evaluation of the
large diameter O-rlngs by the O-ring inspection team revealed no damages.
5.1.8 Nozzle-to-Case Joint
There was no evidence of hot gas or soot past the polysulfide. The grease
application was per specification. There was no corrosion found on either
the fixed housing or the aft dome. No polysulfide extruded past the wiper
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O-ring. A small amount of Teflon tape residue was observed intermittently
at the metal to glass interface on the fixed housing. No radial bolt hole
disassembly plugs were damaged during the disassembly process.
There were no signs of 0-rlng damage at the time of disassembly on the
primary, secondary, or wiper O-rlngs. Detailed inspection of the O-rings
found no damage on the primary O-ring or secondary O-ring. The wiper
O-ring had one light circumferential scratch that measured 4.0 inches in
length and 0.001 inch in width with an indeterminable depth. Inspection of
the Star-O-Seals found four Star-O-Seals with torn seals.
5.1.9 Aft Exit Cone Joint (Joint I)
No pressure paths were found through the RTV, so no pressure or soot
reached the primary O-ring. Light oxidatlon/corroslon was found between
the the O-ring foot prints on the forward and aft exit cone intermittently
around. Both 0-rlngs fell out of the groove at disassembly so no in-groove
inspection was done. Detailed inspection by the O-rlng inspection team
revealed two gouges (207.7 and 227.4 degrees) and two scratches (287 and
349.3 degrees) on the primary O-ring. The worst case being the gouge at
227.4 degrees. The gouge measured 0.25 inch long, 0.02 inch width and 0.01
inch deep. The secondary O-ring sustained seven gouges at 127.8, 151.3
201.1, 220.8, 257.8, 307.3 and 342.2 degrees. The worst case being the
gouge at 342.2 degrees. The gouge measured 0.25 inch long, 0.04 inch width
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and 0.02 inch deep. The cause of the gouges and nicks are suspected to
have been caused by the O-rings falling out at disassembly and the O-ring
clips, which are used to hold the O-rings in place during disassembly.
5.1.10 Forvard End Ring-To-Nose Inlet Housing (Joint 2)
Inspection
the RTV/adhestve of the joint interface.
at 282 to 342 degrees. Sooting was also
entire circumference with the heaviest
degrees. No soot or evidence of blow-by
O-ring. No apparent damage to the primary
during the in groove inspection, and the
of the joint did not reveal any obvious pressure paths through
Soot reached the primary O-ring
noted at the metal interface the
sooting between 324 and 346
was present past the primary
or secondary O-rings was found
sealing surfaces suffered no
assembly or disassembly damage. Detailed inspection of the large diameter
0-rings by the O-ring inspection team revealed no damages.
5.1.11 Nose Inlet Housing-To-Throat Support Housing (Joint 3)
Detailed inspection revealed no anomalies to the joint. Inspection of the
sealing surfaces revealed no signs of damage. No apparent damage was found
during preliminary inspection of the primary and secondary 0-rings.
Detailed inspection of the large diameter 0-rings by the 0-ring inspection
team also showed no damage occurred to the 0-rings.
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5.1.12 Forward Exit Cone-To-Throat Support Housing (Joint 4)
Inspection of the joint at disassembly revealed no pressure paths through
the RTV backfill. Light intermittent corrosion was noted around the
circumference of the bondllne to metal interface on both components. No
apparent damage to the primary and secondary O-rings was found during
preliminary inspection, and the sealing surfaces suffered no assembly/dis-
assembly damage. Detailed inspection of the large diameter O-rings by the
O-ring inspection team revealed no anomalies.
5.1.13 Fixed Housing-To-Aft End Ring (Joint 5)
Detailed inspection of the joint revealed some medium corrosion between 195
and 290 degrees outboard of the secondary seal on the aft end ring. In-
spection of the sealing surfaces revealed no signs of damage. No damage
was found during preliminary inspection of the primary and secondary
O-rings. Detailed inspection of the large diameter O-rings by the O-ring
inspection team revealed no damages. Inspection of all the Star-O-Seals
showed typical disassembly damage.
5.1.14 Factory Joints
Design Engineering resumed inspection of factory joints on Fifth Flight
components. Because of schedule problems with the case hardware and a
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sufficient database on factory joints, the post-flight inspection was
discontinued until Fifth Flight. Inspection has resumed on Fifth Flight to
evaluate the new grease application techniques incorporated on Fifth Flight
factory joints.
5.1.14.1 Forward Dome-to-Cyllnder Factory Joint. No anomalies were
reported from the on sight inspection of this joint. No corrosion was
observed on the outer clevis leg or internal joint. Overall grease
application was nomlnal in respect to the incorporated application
technique. Insulation and Chemlok were found on the land forward of the
primary O-ring groove 80 percent around the circumference of the joint.
Inspection of the large diameter O-rings found a 0.50 inch long scratch at
277 degrees on the primary O-rlng. The scratch was 0.003 inch wide by
0.001 inch deep.
5.1.14.2 Forward Cylinder-to-Cylinder Factory Joint. No anomalies were
reported from the on sight inspection of this joint. No corrosion was
observed on the outer clevis leg or internal joint. Overall grease
application was nominal in respect to the incorporated application
technique. Insulation and Chemlok were found on the land forward of the
primary 0-rlng groove 90 percent around the circumference of the joint.
Inspection of the large diameter 0-rings found no damage on the primary or
secondary 0-rings.
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5.1.14.3 Center Forward Cyllnder-to-Cylinder Factor), Joint. The outer
clevis leg tip had light to medium corrosion 60 percent of the full
circumference. No corrosion was observed in the internal joint areas. The
overall grease application was light. Insulation and Chemlok were found on
the land forward of the primary 0-rlng groove 30 percent around the circum-
ference of the joint.
Small
204,
tang
206,
pits.
pits were observed
206 and 324 degrees. Similar pits
sealing surface at 154, 156, 158,
219, 235-337, 324 and 328 degrees.
Pits in the same
on the land between the O-ring grooves at 202,
were observed on the associated
161, 164-170, 173-180, 202, 204,
No corrosion was noted with these
degree location on interfacing hardware gives an
indication of fretting.
Inspection of the large diameter O-rings found no damage on the primary or
secondary O-rings.
5.1.14.4 Center Aft Cylinder-to-Cylinder Factory Joint. No corrosion was
observed on the outer clevis leg or internal joint. Overall grease
application was light wlth intermittent areas of nominal coverage in
respect to the incorporated application technique. Heavier than normal
insulation and Chemlok were found on the land forward of the primary O-ring
groove 60 percent around the circumference of the joint.
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Fretting was observed on the land between the O-ring
associated mating surface on the tang at 190, 194,
degrees.
grooves and on the
202, 330, and 350
Inspection of the large diameter 0-rlngs found no damage on the primary or
secondary O-rings.
5.1.14.5 ETA-to-Stiffener Factory Joint. During disassembly operations,
the water knife (tool used to remove insulation) cut through the primary
O-ring at 115 degrees. Water knife damage was indicated from 88 to 138
degrees on the primary O-ring. This caused debris and moisture to
contaminate the internal joint region. Fluid was noted in the port due to
the water knife. Light corrosion was noted on the land forward of the
primary O-ring at 106 degrees. The overall grease coverage was nominal.
Insulation and Chemlok were found on the land forward of the primary 0-ring
groove 30 percent around the circumference of the joint.
A diagonal scratch was noted on the secondary O-ring at 340 degrees. The
scratch measured 0.15 inch long, 0.002 inch wide and 0.001 inch deep.
5.1.14.6 Stiffener-to-Stlffener Factory Joint. No corrosion was observed
on the outer clevis leg or internal joint. 0verall grease application was
nominal in respect to the incorporated application technique. Insulation
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and Chemlok were found on the land forward of the primary O-ring groove 30
percent around the circumference of the joint.
Light scratches were noted intermittently the full circumference on the
land forward of the primary O-ring groove. Light scratches and burnishes
were also noted Intermittently the full circumference on the chamfer of the
tang indicating an interference fit during assembly.
Inspection of the large diameter O-rlngs found no damage on the primary or
secondary O-rlngs.
5.1.14.7
had light to medium corrosion 90 percent of the full
corrosion was observed in the internal joint areas. The overall
application was light. Insulation and Chemlok were
forward of the primary O-ring groove 70 percent around the circumference of
the joint.
Aft Dome-to-Stlffener Factory Joint. The outer clevis leg tip
circumference. No
grease
found on the land
Fretting was observed on the land between the O-rlng grooves and on the
associated mating surface on the tang at 234, 236, 238, 242, 245-256, 264,
265, 282 and 286 degrees. Also, pits were observed on the tang downstream
of the sealing surface at 22, 30 and 34 degrees. These pits were
approximately 0.010 inch deep.
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Inspection of the large diameter O-rings found scratches at 234 and 236
degrees on the primary O-ring. The scratches measured 0.20 inch long,
0.002 inch wide and 0.005 inch deep. The scratches were probably caused by
the raised metal at the corresponding fretted locations.
5.2 Right Motor Disassembly Rvaluation
There were no critical observations found on the right motor.
5.2.1 External Walk Around
The external walk around inspection revealed no signs of hot gas leakage
past any joints.
5.2.2 Safe and Are Joint (Adapter-to-Barrler Booster)
There was soot up to the primary seal on both sides of the S&A gasket. No
soot was observed past the primary seals. Intermittent light corrosion was
found on the inboard edge of the metal retainer of the gasket. No other
damage was found to the joint or gasket seals at the time of disassembly.
Detailed inspection of the gasket by the O-ring inspection team revealed no
anomalous conditions.
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Detailed
secondary
evidence
found in the grease on the secondary
determined the copper is from fittings in
Circumferential closed flow lines were
removed from the S&A.
inspection of the S&A upon disassembly revealed the primary and
O-rings of the rotor shaft were in good condition, with no
of blow-by or heat effects found. Some copper particles were
O-rings. An investigation has
the vendor leak test equipment.
noted on an environmental seal
The largest measured 0.120 inch long.
Inspection of the barrier booster (B-B) rotor shaft housing bore revealed
two axial scratches which could be felt using a 5 and i0 mil piece of brass
shim stock. The scratches were found on the secondary seal surface.
It was determined that these scratches were caused by the bore micrometer
used at E-VAD (the vendor) to measure the bore diameters prior to assembly.
The footprint of these scratches are similar to the ones found on Fourth
Flight.
The B-B leak check port plug (126 degrees) had a metal burr on the tip of
the plug below the lead thread. It was also noted that the grease
application on this plug was slightly heavy. The S&A to adapter leak check
plug (306 degrees) appeared to have no grease applied. A small void was
found in the O.D. of the S&A leak test port plug. The void measured 0.05
inch long, 0.015 inch wide, and 0.003 inch deep.
The initiators were removed from the B-B and inspected. No evidence of
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blow-by was found past the threads. The primary sealing surface of each
initiator was inspected for threads protruding into the sealing region.
None were found. One small deformation was noted on each of the sealing
washers initiators. The deformation was probably caused by the
removal This washer forms the sealing surface of the secondary
O-ring. secondary 0-ring of the initiator
5.2.3 Outer Igniter Joint (Adapter-to-Forward Dome)
A blow hole through the zinc chromate putty was observed at 270 degrees.
The path measured from 2.0 inches to 0.38 inch at the exit. Two terminated
blow holes were observed at 124 and 233 degrees. Heavy soot was noted on
the inner retainer edge of the gasket 360 degrees. No soot reached the
primary seal on either side of the gasket. Light corrosion was noted on
the edge of the retainer at 270 degrees. Intermittent light corrosion was
found on the edge of the forward dome boss and igniter adapter inboard of
the primary sealing surface. No gasket seal damage was observed at the
time of disassembly.
5.2.4 Inner Igniter Joint (Adapter-to-Chamber)
No blow holes were found in the zinc chromate putty on the inner igniter
joint. Soot reached the outer primary seal on the aft face from the blow
hole in the outer joint at 270 degrees. Medium corrosion was also noted on
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the inner gasket outer retainer edge at 270 degrees. An indentation was
observed in the crown of the inner primary seal at 220 degrees on the aft
face. The indentation was approximately 0.10 inch long by 0.025 inch wide.
The indentation slowly rebounded after disassembly. Dissection of the
area revealed two small subsurface voids. Additional inspection criteria
was implemented to find these type of voids prior to assembly in the joint.
All star-o-seals from the inner joint bolts were damaged during
disassembly.
There was heavy soot on the end of special bolts, and light soot to the
primary seals at 40, 100, 180, and 270 degrees.
Inspection of the OPTs (operational pressure transducers) located at 40,
180, and 270 degrees showed soot deposits up to the primary seals.
Inspection of the special bolt and IPT plugs located at 100 and 115 degrees
respectively, showed soot deposits up to the primary seals. No anomalous
conditions were noted on the seals or plugs.
5.2.5 Forward Field Joint
There was no sign of hot gas or soot past the J-leg. The grease coverage
was per design and no corrosion was found on any sealing surface. Light
intermittent corrosion spots were observed on the outside diameter of the
tang, forward of the pin holes. The outside diameter of the outer clevis
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leg showed intermittent light surface corrosion from zero to 360 degrees on
the one inch unpainted surface. The joint was heavily contaminated with
debris from hydrolaze operations, which is used to remove the joint
protection system.
No seal damage was observed at the time of disassembly, and the V2 filler
was properly installed with no visible damage. Detailed inspection of the
large diameter O-rlngs revealed no damages.
5.2.6 Center Field Joint
There was no sign of hot gas or soot past the J-leg. The grease coverage
was per design and no corrosion was found on any sealing surface. No
corrosion was found on any of the joint interior surfaces. The outside
diameter of the outer clevis leg showed very light intermittent corrosion
from zero to 360 degrees on the one inch unpainted surface. The joint was
heavily contaminated with debris from hydrolaze operations. No seal damage
was observed on theprimary or secondary O-rings at the time of disassem-
bly. The V2 filler was properly installed and no visible damage was found.
Detailed inspection of the large diameter 0-rings revealed a radial scratch
at 249 degrees on the capture feature O-ring. The radial scratch measured
0.20 inch long, 0.005 inch wide and 0.005 inch deep.
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5.2.7 Aft Field Joint
There was no sign of hot gas or soot past the J-leg. The grease coverage
was per design and no corrosion was found on any sealing surface. Light
intermittent pin hole and shim area corrosion was found on the inner
surface of the outer clevis leg. The outside diameter of the outer clevis
leg showed intermittent light surface corrosion from zero to 360 degrees on
the one inch unpainted surface. Hedlum corrosion was also found on the
tang bottom tip from 146 to 150 degrees. The joint was heavily contami-
nated with debris from hydrolaze operations.
No seal damage was observed at the time of disassembly, and the V2 filler
was properly installed with no visible damage. Detailed inspection of the
large diameter O-rings revealed no damages.
5.2.8 Nozzle-to-Case Joint
There was no evidence of hot gas or soot past the polysulfide. The grease
application was per specification. There was no corrosion found on either
the fixed housing or the aft dome. Polysulfide extruded past the wiper
O-ring at 166 degrees but did not reach the primary O-ring. The radial
bolt hole disassembly plug at 282.6 degrees was sheared off at disassembly.
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There was no sign of
primary, secondary or
O-ring damage at the time of disassembly on the
wiper O-rings. Detailed inspection of the large
diameter O-rlngs by the O-rlng inspection team revealed a circumferential
scratch at 115.7 degrees and diagonal scratches at 129 degrees on the
primary O-ring. The worst case scratch at 129 degrees measured 0.40 inch
long, 0.002 inch wide and an indeterminable depth. The wiper O-ring had
two nicks at 22.9 and 34 degrees. The worst case nick at 22.9 degrees
measured 0.50 inch long, 0.02 inch wide and 0.01 inch deep. Inspection of
the Stat-O-Seals revealed two torn seals.
5.2.9 Aft Exit Cone Joint (Joint 1)
No pressure paths were found through the RTV, so no pressure or soot
reached the primary O-ring. Light oxidation/corrosion was found between
the the O-rlng foot prints on the forward and aft exit cone intermittently
around.
No damage to the primary or secondary O-rings was observed at the time of
disassembly. Inspection of the large diameter O-rings conducted by the
inspection team revealed
133.5 degrees. The worst
wide and 0.03 inch deep.
several gouges and scratches between 112.2 and
case gouge measured 0.40 inch long, 0.04 inch
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5.2.10 Forvard End Ring-To-Nose Inlet Housing (Joint 2)
Inspection of the Joint did not reveal any obvious pressure paths through
the RTV/adheslve of the joint interface. Soot reached the primary 0-ring
at 18 to 38, 68 to 84, 162 to 176, 195, 207, 228 to 234, 250 to 258, 264 to
267, 270 to 281, 283 to 288 and 305 degrees. Sooting was found in the
metal interface the entire circumference. No soot or evidence of blow-by
was present past the primary 0-rlng.
No
groove inspection, and the sealing surfaces
disassembly damage. Detailed inspection of the
the 0-ring inspection team revealed no damage.
apparent damage to the primary or secondary O-rings was found on the in
suffered no assembly or
large diameter 0-rings by
5.2.11 Nose Inlet Housing-To-Throat Support Housing (Joint 3)
Detailed inspection revealed no anomalies to the joint. No apparent damage
was found during preliminary inspection of the primary or secondary
0-rings. Inspection of the sealing surfaces revealed no signs of damage.
Detailed inspection of the large diameter O-rings by the O-ring inspection
team revealed no damage.
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5.2.12 Forward Exit Cone-To-Throat Support Housing (Joint 4)
Inspection of the joint revealed a pressure path through the RTV backfill
between 235 and 263 degrees. Typical light corrosion was noted on the
forward exit cone/throat bondline the full circumference. No apparent
damage to the primary or secondary 0-rings was found during preliminary
inspection, and the sealing surfaces suffered no assembly/disassembly
damage. Detailed inspection of the large diameter 0-rings by the 0-ring
inspection team revealed no damage.
5.2.13 Fixed Housing-To-Aft End Ring (Joint 5)
Detailed inspection revealed medium corrosion outboard of the secondary
0-ring on the aft end ring from 165 to 225 degrees. No damage was found
during preliminary inspection of the primary or secondary O-rings.
Inspection of the sealing surface revealed no signs of damage.
Detailed inspection of the large diameter O-rings by the O-rlng inspection
team noted a diagonal scratch at 70 degrees on the primary 0-ring. The
scratch measured 0.12 inch long, 0.002 inch wide and 0.002 inch deep.
Inspection of all the Stat-0-Seals showed typical disassembly damage.
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5.2.14 Factory Joints
Design Engineering resumed inspection of factory joints on Fifth Flight
components. Because of schedule problems with the case hardware and a
sufficient database on factory joints the post-fllght inspection was
discontinued until Fifth Flight. Inspection has resumed on Fifth Flight to
evaluate the new grease application techniques incorporated on Fifth Flight
factory joints.
5.2.14.1 Forward Dome-to-Cylinder Factory Joint. No anomalies were
reported from the on sight inspection of this joint. No corrosion was
observed on the outer clevis leg or internal joint. 0verall grease
application was nominal in respect to the incorporated application
technique. Small pits were noted on the land between the O-rlng grooves.
No corresponding pits on the tang were noted to indicate fretting.
Insulation and Chemlok were found on the land forward of the primary O-ring
groove 80 percent around the circumference of the joint.
Inspection of the large diameter 0-rings found no damage on the primary or
secondary 0-rings.
5.2.14.2 Forward Cylinder-to-Cylinder Factory Joint. No anomalies were
reported from the on sight inspection of this joint. No corrosion was
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observed on the outer clevis leg or internal joint. Light corrosion was
noted intermittently on the outer tang surface. Overall grease application
was nominal in respect to the incorporated application technique. Insula-
tion and Chemlok were found on the land forward of the primary O-ring
groove 70 percent around the circumference of the joint.
Inspection of the large diameter 0-rings found no damage on the primary or
secondary 0-rlngs.
5.2.14.3 Center Forward Cylinder-to-Cylinder Factory Joint. No anomalies
were reported from the on sight inspection of this joint. No corrosion was
observed on the outer clevis leg. Light corrosion was noted at the zero
degree location inside the clevis end of the joint. Overall grease appli-
cation was nominal in respect to the incorporated application technique.
Insulation and Chemlok were found on the land forward of the primary 0-ring
groove intermittently around the circumference of the joint.
Inspection of the large diameter 0-rlngs found no damage on the primary or
secondary 0-rings.
5.2.14.4 Center Aft Cylinder-to-Cylinder Factory Joint. No corrosion was
observed on the outer clevis leg or internal joint. Overall grease appli-
cation was nominal coverage in respect to the incorporated application
technique. A small amount of fluid was noted in the clevis root at l, 242
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to 252, and 322 degrees. Laboratory analysis of the fluid showed the fluid
to be inhibited water from the water knife.
Inspection of the large diameter 0-rings found no damage on the primary or
secondary O-rings.
5.2.14.5 ETA-to-Stiffener Factory Joint. No corrosion was observed on the
outer clevis leg or internal joint. Overall grease application was nominal
in respect to the incorporated application technique. Insulation and
Chemlok were found on the land forward of the primary O-ring groove inter-
mittently 50 percent around the circumference of the joint.
Light scratches and burnishes were noted at zero to 50 and 70 degrees on
the land forward of the primary 0-ring groove. Light scratches and
burnishes were noted at 50, 150, 154, 298, 300 and 358 degrees on the land
between the O-ring grooves. Light scratches and burnishes were also noted
intermittently the full circumference on the chamfer of the tang indicating
an interference fit during assembly.
No damage was noted on the large diameter primary and secondary 0-rings.
5.2.14.6 Stiffener-to-Stiffener Factory Joint. No corrosion was observed
on the outer clevis leg or internal joint. Overall grease application was
light in respect to the incorporated application technique. Insulation and
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Chemlok were found on the land forward of the primary O-ring groove
Intermittently 70 percent around the circumference of the joint.
Inspection of the large diameter O-rings found radial scratches at 156.4
and 241.3 degrees on the primary O-ring. The worst case scratch at 156.4
degrees measured 0.20 inch long, 0.002 inch wide and 0.002 inch deep.
5.2.14.7 Aft Dome-to-Stiffener Factory Joint. No corrosion was observed
on the outer clevis leg or in the internal joint areas. The overall grease
application was nominal. Insulation and Chemlok were found on the land
forward of the primary 0-ring groove intermittently 80 percent around the
circumference of the joint.
Inspection of the port plug and port threads found no damage. Inspection
of the large diameter O-rings found no damage on the primary or secondary
O-rings.
5.3 Leak Check and Vent Port Phtg Post-Flight Evaluations
The evaluation of the port plugs after flight use consisted of adding to
the port plug torque database, visual inspection of the port plug for
damage, and visual inspection of the port plug O-rings for anomalies.
The port plugs had breakaway torques recorded. This exercise was done to
add to the port plug torque database so evaluation of installation torque
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levels and locking devices can be made on each port plug.
A summary of the post-flight inspection evaluations of the port plugs and
port plug O-rings is contained in Table 1. Port plugs in the field joints
and nozzle to case joints were removed during disassembly operations at
KSC. Port plugs in the factory joints, internal nozzle joints and igniter
were removed at Clearfield. An initial inspection was done at that time.
Closure plugs were removed from the adjustable port plugs by the Thiokol
O-ring Inspection Team. All port plugs and O-rings were then inspected by
the Thiokol O-ring Inspection Team as a final inspection.
During the initial inspection at KSC several observations were reported.
The most recurrent observation was extrusion damage to the O.D. and I.D. of
the primary O-ring on the adjustable vent port plug. The extrusion damage
was caused during installation of the port plug into the port. This damage
is an acceptable condition due to the design of the primary seal. The
primary O-ring is used as a packing seal. When the adjustable vent port
plug is fully installed in the vent port, the primary O-ring extrudes out
of the gland area and is damaged. The damage is inherent to the design.
Light corrosion on the port plug heads and port spotfaces is another
recurrent observation. The planning to install the port plugs has been
updated on subsequent flights to include a more thorough application of
grease preservative to the port area to prevent this type of corrosion.
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Initial inspection of the port plugs removed at Clearfleld continued to
find several reoccurring problems. The lack of grease on some port plugs,
O-rlngs and/or ports was noted. Port plug head gouges were reported on two
factory joint leak check port plugs. The gouges are caused by pneumatic
chisels used to remove the weather seal. The gouges do not affect the use
or removal of the port plug but the breakaway torque readings taken for
evaluation are invalidated.
The final inspection of the port plugs and O-rings by the Thiokol O-ring
Inspection Team documented the I.D. cut observation on the shoulder 0-ring
from fifteen port plugs. The observation consists of a cut that extends
circumferentially around the I.D. of the O-ring. The length and depth of
the cut varies. A sharp last thread on the port plug is the cause of the
cut. The cut occurs as the port plug is removed from the port and the
O-ring is rubbed along the thread. O-rlng installation aids were used to
install the discrepant O-rings on the port plugs to prevent this type of
damage during installation. The small punctures noted on the transducer
secondary O-rings is caused by the tool used to remove the O-rlng from the
groove.
A circumferential scratch, 0.250 inch long, was noted on the dovetail of
the left hand forward field joint vent port plug. Radial scratches were
also noted on the seal surface of the right hand outer igniter leak check
port plug.
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Table 1
360B005 LEAK CHECK AND VENT PORT PLUG INSPECTION
Joint
Location
Forward
Field
Center
Field
Part
Inspected
Adjust. Vent
Port Plug
Primary
O-ring
Sec. O-rlng
Closure Plugl
O-ring
Leak Check
Plug
O-ring
Adjust. Vent
Port Plug
Primary
O-ring
Secondary
0-rlng
Closure Plug
O-ring
Leak Check
Plug
O-ring
LEFT HAND (5A)
Initial Final
Inspection [ Inspection
Corrosion on
Port Spotface
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
Corrosion on
Port Spotface
O.D. Circum.
Impression
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
I.D. Circum.
Cut (0.250 in.
Length)
Circum.Scratch
on dovetail
(0.010 in.)
O.D. Extrusion
Damage
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
I.D. Circum.
Cut (0.030 in.[
Length) [
[
RIGHT HAND (SB)
Initial Final
Inspection Inspection
Corrosion on
Port Spotface
O.D. Extrusion
Damage
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
O.D. Extrusion
Marks
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
I.D. Circum.
Cut (0.140 in.
Length)
Raised metal
on Ist intern.
thread of top
O.D. Extrusion
Mark
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
I.D. Circum.
Cut (0.050 in.
Length)
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Table 1 (cont.)
360H005 LEAK CHECK AND VENT PORT PLUG INSPECTION
Joint
Location
Aft
Field
Nozzle
to Case
Part
Inspected
Adjust. Vent
Port Plug
Primary
0-ring
Sec. O-ring
Closure Plug
0-ring
Leak Check
Plug
0-ring
Adjust. Vent
Port Plug
Primary
O-ring
LEFT HAND (5A)
Initial Final
Inspection ] Inspection
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
Medium corros.
on plug hex &
port spotface
O.D. Extrusion
Damage
No Damage
0.D. & I.D.
extrusion Mark
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
I.D. Circum.
Cut (0.450 in
Leng th )
No Damage
O.D. & I.D.
Extrusion
Damage
RIGHT HAND (5B)
Initial Final
Inspection Inspection
No Damage
0.D. Extrusion
Damage
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
corrosion on
plug hex &
port spotface
O.D. Extrusion
Damage
Sec. 0-rlng
!Closure Plug
0-ring
Leak Check
Plug
0-ring
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
Corrosion on
spotface
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
No Grease
on threads
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
Corrosion on
spotface
No Damage
No Damage
0.D. & I.D.
extrusion mark
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
O.D. Extrusion
Damage
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
I
I I.D. Circum.
[Cut (0.350 in.
[ Length)
I
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Table 1 (cont.)
360H005 LEAK CHECK AND VENT PORT PLUG INSPECTION
Joint
Location
Part
Inspected
LEFT HAND (5A)
Initial Final
Inspection I Inspection
RIGHT HAND (5B)
Initial Final
Inspection Inspection
Internal Nozzle Joints
No.1 No Damage No Damage No Damage No Damage
No. 2
No. 3
No •4
No. 5
Leak Check
Plug
0-ring
Leak Check
Plug
O-ring
Leak Check
Plug
0-ring
Leak Check
Plug
O-ring
Leak Check
Plug
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
I.D. Circum.
Cut (0.030 in.
Length)
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
Poss. closed
flow lines
(0.040" Length
No Damage
0.D. Circum.
Cut (0.200 in.
Length)
No Damage
O-ring No Damage No Damage No Damage No Damage
Factory Joints
No Grease Rolled Threads Light grease Rolled ThreadForward
Dome
!Forward
Segment
Leak Check
Plug
O-ring
Leak Check
Plug
O-ring
No Grease
Light grease
No Grease
No Damage
No grease
Rolled Threads
I.D. circum.
cut (0.150 in.
No grease
] Light grease
No grease
No grease
No Damage
No grease
Little Grease
I.D. circum.
cut (0.030 in
length)
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Table 1 (cont.)
360H005 LEAK CHECK AND VENT PORT PLUG INSPECTION
Joint Part
Location Inspected
Factory Joints
LEFT HAND (5A)
Initial Final
Inspection [ Inspection
RIGHT HAND (5B)
Initial Final
Inspection Inspection
Forward
!Center
Segment
Aft
Center
Segment
Attach
to
Stif-
fener
Stiffen-
er to
Stiffner
Aft
Dome
Leak Check
Plug
O-rlng
Leak Check
Plug
O-ring
Leak Check
Plug
O-ring
Leak Check
Plug
O-ring
Leak Check
Plug
O-ring
No Damage
No Damage
No Grease
No Grease
Plg Hd Damaged
Fluid in port
No Grease
No Grease
No Grease
No Grease
No Grease
Lst thread has
sm. depression
I.D. circum.
Cut (0.050 in.
length)
No Grease
No Grease
Rolled Threads
No Grease
No Grease
I.D. Circum.
Cut (0.350 in.
Length)
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
I.D. Circum.
Cut (0.i00 in.
Length)
Light grease
Light grease
Plug Head
Scratches
Light grease
Light grease
Plug head
scratches
iLight grease
Light grease
Plug Head
scratches
Light grease
No Damage
No Damage
I.D. circum.
Cut (0.070 in.
length)
No Damage
I.D. Circum.
Cut (0.250 in.
length)
Rolled Thread
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
No Grease
on threads
No Damage
I
[ I
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Table I (cont.)
360H005 LEAK CHECK AND VENT PORT PLUG INSPECTION
Joint
Location
Part
Inspected
LEFT HAND (5A)
Initial Final
Inspection Inspection
RIGHT HAND (SB)
Initial Final
Inspection I Inspection
Igniter
IPT No Damage No Damage No Damage No Damage
Outer
Joint
Inner
Joint
Transd.
40 Deg.
Transd.
I00 Deg.
Transd.
180 Deg.
Transd.
270 Deg.
Special
Bolt
40 Deg.
Special
Bolt
100 Deg.
Transducer
Primary
O-rlng
Secondary
O-ring
Leak Check
Plug
O-ring
Leak Check
Plug
O-ring
Primary
Secondary
Primary
Secondary
Primary
Secondary
Primary
Secondary
Primary
Stat-O-Seal
Primary
Star-O-Seal
No Damage
N/A
NIA
N/A
N/A
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
Sm. Puncture
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
Sm. Puncture
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
Closed flow
Line
No Damage
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
Small Puncture
Two radial
Scratches
(0.040 in.
& o.o5o)
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
Small Punture
No Damage
Small Puncture
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
Small Puncture
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
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Table 1 (cont.)
360H005 LEAK CHECK AND VENT PORT PLUG INSPECTION
Joint
Location
Igniter
Special
Bolt
180 Deg.
Special
Bolt
270 Deg.
Part
Inspected
LEFT HAND (5A)
Initial Final
Inspection Inspection
RIGHT HAND (5B)
Initial Final
Inspection Inspection
Primary
Stat-0-Seal
Primary
Stat-0-Seal
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
I.D. scratch
(0.080 in.)
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
No Damage
5.4 Post-Flight Team Assessments
The Component Program Teams (CPT) have reviewed all of the observations
presented in this document and have determined that the following
observations were "potential anomalles", classified as critical, major,
minor or remains observation, as defined under Table 2 criteria.
Each "potential anomaly" is tracked by a Post-Fire Anomaly Record (PFAR).
Corrective actions and results of the corrective action are recorded on the
PFAR. Once all the corrective actions on the PFAR are completed, the PFAR
is closed.
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5.4.1 Remains Observation
Two "potential anomalies" were classified as remains observation. These
observations are:
.
.
Circumferential closed flow lines were found on an
environmental seal of the right motor S&A. The largest
measured 0.120 inch long.
Rolled threads on the last partial thread of leak check plugs
removed from the right and left hand motor.
5.4.2 Minor Anomalies
Nine "potential anomalies" were classified as minor anomalies. These minor
anomalies are:
I.
.
.
.
.
A small void was found in the 0.D. of the S&A leak test port
plug O-ring off the right hand motor. The void measured
approximately 0.05 inch long, 0.015 inch wide and 0.003 inch
deep.
Small copper particles were found in the grease on the high
pressure side of the rotor shaft secondary O-rings in the
right motor S&A.
Axial scratches were found across the Barrier-Booster rotor
shaft housing bore primary and secondary seal surfaces on
both right and left motor S&As.
Lack of/ or excessive grease was noted on the S&A leak test
plugs. Two on right hand motor and one on the left motor.
Deformations were found on the sealing washer on the SII's.
The deformations are circumferential and follow the pattern
of the NSI. The largest deformations, located over the
wrench slots, are approximately 0.003 inch deep. These
deformations were noted on both SII's off of both right and
left motors.
REVISION ooc.o. TWR-17544 I _L IV
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., No grease on a leak check port plugs/ O-rings taken off the
left and right hand motor.
. Radial scratches on the seal surface of the outer igniter
leak check port plug removed from the right motor.
. Scratch on the dovetail of the adjustable vent port plug
removed from the left motor.
.
Raised metal in the first internal thread of the top portion
of the adjustable vent port plug removed from the right hand
center field joint.
5.4.3 Major Anomalies
One "potential anomaly" was classified as major anomaly.
is:
1.
The major anomaly
An indentation found on the inner primary seal of the inner
igniter gasket of the right hand motor at 220 degrees on the
gasket aft face.
5.4.4 Critical Anomalies
There were no critical anomalies.
5.5 RPRB Position
Each PFAR was taken
Component Program Team.
presented.
to the RPRB and presented as recommended by the
The RPRB was asked for acceptance of the PFAR as
The RPRB has accepted all the recommendations as presented to the board
(see Appendix A).
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Table 2
Criteria for Classifying "Potentlal Anomalies"
Anomaly
Remains
Observation Minor Major Critical
Requires no
Specific
Action
Requires correc-
tive action,
but has no
impact on:
- Motor Performance
- Program Schedule
Does not reduce
usability of part
for its intended
function
Could cause damage
preventing reuse
of hardware in
combination with
other anomaly
Significant depar-
ture from the his-
torical database
Could cause failure
in combination w/
other anomaly
Could cause damage
preventing reuse
of hardware
Program acceptance
of cause, correct-
ive action, and
risk assessment re-
quired before sub-
sequent static test
or flight
Violates CEI Spec.
requirements
Could cause failure
and possible loss
of mission/life
Mandatory resolution
before subsequent
static test/flight
Note: These criteria to be applied to the specific observed "potential
anomaly" as it relates to the observed article and as it relates to
subsequent articles.
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APPENDIX A
RFRB PRESENTATIONS
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RPRB PRESENTATION
360H005 SEAL COMPONENTS POST FLIGHT EVALUATION AT KSC
6 SEPTEMBER 1989
J.T. CURRY
JOINTS AND SEALS DESIGN
COORDINATED WITH:
PM: B. Crosbie
IE: K. Kobayashi
DE: G. Abawi
QE: P. Fearns
SE: D, Starrett
QA: G. Nielson
Reliability: J. Richards
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INFORMAl"ION ON THIS PAGE WAS PREPARED TO SUPPORT AN ORAL PRESENTATION
AND CANNOT BE CONSIDERED COMPLETE WlIlHOU[ THE ORAL DISCUSSION
INTRODUCTION
360H005B IGNITER GASKET INDENTATION
PROBLEM REPORT:
• KSC PR No. PV6-137080
• PFAR No. 360H005B-04
DESCRIPTION:
• AN INDENTATION WAS FOUND ON THE INNER PRIMARY SEAL OF THE INNER
IGNITER GASKET (PIN 1U51926-01, SIN 28) OF THE 5B MOTOR AT 220
DEGREES ON THE GASKET AFT FACE. THE CROWN OF THE SEAL WAS
DEPRESSED INWARD AND MEASURED APPROXIMATELY 0.10 INCH LONG
CIRCUMFERENTIALLY BY 0.025 INCH WIDE RADIALLY.
• PRESENTED TO EMT ON 25 AUGUST 1989
_ CORPORAT/ON
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INFORMATION ON THIS PAGE WAS PREPARED TO SUPPORT AN ORAL PRESENTATION
AND CANNOT BE CONSIOEREID COMP1.ETE WITHOUT THE ORAL DISCUSSION
INTRODUCTION cont.
TEAM CLASSIFICATION:
• Major Anomaly with Corrective Action
RELIABILITY:
• SPR No. DR4-51168.
IN FLIGHT ANOMALY:
• IFA No. STS-28-M-1.
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AND CANNOT BE CONSIDERED COMPLEIE WITHOUT THE ORAl. DISCUSSION
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INTRODUCTION cont.
QM-7/ 360L003B IGNITER GASKET INDENTATION
PROBLEM REPORT:
= PFAR No. QM-7-007
• NO PR WRITTEN.
DESCRIPTION:
AN INDENTATION WAS FOUND ON THE PRIMARY SEAL OF THE OUTER IGNITER
GASKET (PIN 1U51927-01, SIN 4R1) OF THE QM-7/ 3B MOTOR AT 97 DEG.
ON THE GASKET FORWARD FACE. THE CROWN OF THE SEAL WAS DEPRESSED
OUTWARD FROM THE MOTOR CENTERLINE.
• INDENTATION SMALLER THAN OTHERS PREVIOUSLY REPORTED.
APPARENT UNTIL COMPRESSED UNDER PLEXIGLAS FIXTURE.
NOT VISUALLY
ANOMALY DOCUMENTATION DISCOVERED
GASKET PROBLEM.
DURING INVESTIGATION OF 360H005B
IMPROPER DOCUMENTATION OF OBSERVATION ON QM-7 PFOR SHEET.
• QM-7 OBSERVATION DOCUMENTED IN MEMO L224:FY89:086
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INFORMATION ON THIS PAGE WAS PREPARED TO SUPPORT AN ORAL PRESENTATION
AND CANNOT BE CONSIDERED COMPt.EIE WITHOUT THE ORAl. DISCUSSION
INTRODUCTION cont.
TEAM CLASSIFICATION:
• Major Anomaly with Corrective Action
RELIABILITY:
• SPR No. DR4-51171
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INFORMATION ON THIS PAGE WAS PREPARED TO SUPPOIIT AN ORAL PRESENTA'nON
ANO CANNOT BE CONSIDERED COMI%ETE WITHOUT THE ORAL DISCUSSION
HISTORY
DM-9 OUTER GASKET
A DEPRESSION IN THE CROWN OF THE PRIMARY SEAL WAS FOUND AT
144 DEGREES. ANOMALY WAS THE RESULT OF TRAPPED GAS (VOID)
AND NITRILE RESIDUE (CONTAMINATION). CLASSIFIED MAJOR
ANOMALY BY RPRB.
• QM-6 SAFE AND ARM GASKET
A DEPRESSION IN THE CROWN OF THE PRIMARY SEAL WAS FOUND AT
225 DEGREES. APPROXIMATE DIMENSIONS ARE 0.25 INCH LONG BY
0.0156 INCH DEEP. ANOMALY WAS THE RESULT OF TRAPPED GAS
(VOIDS) AND MOLD DEFECT. CLASSIFIED MAJOR ANOMALY BY RPRB.
• THERE IS CURRENTLY NO VENDOR INSPECTIONS TO FIND SUBSURFACE VOIDS
OR POROSITY.
• CORRECTIVE ACTION TO IMPROVE SEAL INSPECTION NOT COMPLETED
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AND CANNOT BE CONSIDERED COMPLEIE WITHOUT THE ORAL DISCUSSION
6
CONCLUSIONS
INDENTATION IS CAUSED BY A SUBSURFACE VOID OR POROUS REGION.
• TO BE CONFIRMED WHEN SEAL IS DISSECTED
HISTORY SHOWS INDENTATIONS ARE DISCOVERED AFTER USE
NEWLY REFURBISHED GASKETS.
OF NEW OR
• THE ANOMALY BECOMES EVIDENT AFTER THE GASKET IS COMPRESSED IN AN
ASSEMBLY.
NO VOIDS HAVE BEEN DETECTED ON GASKETS THAT HAVE HAD PREVIOUS
(AFTER SECOND OR SUBSEQUENT USE)
USE.
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AND CANNOT BE CONSIOERED COMPt.EIE WITHOUT THE ORAL DISCUSSION
SHORT TERM CORRECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS
• TEAM MEETING WITH VENDOR TO INVESTIGATE PREVIOUS
ACTIONS AND IMPLEMENTATION.
CORRECTIVE
REPLACE ALL NEW OR NEWLY REFURBISHED GASKETS WITH ACCEPTABLE USED
GASKETS.
• VISUAL, HAND AND PLEXIGLAS INSPECTION DONE ON GASKETS
FLIGHT 6
• REMOVE AND REPLACE IGNITER OUTER `AND S&A GASKETS WITH USED
GASKETS. (BOTH 360LOO6 OUTER GASKETS ARE NEW)
• OPERATION WILL REQUIRE REPLACEMENT OF ATTACH BOLTS AND OPT's
• OPERATION WILL REQUIRE NEW LEAK TESTS ON S&A, OPT's AND
IGNITER OUTER JOINT.
FLIGHT 7
• THE SAME RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONDITIONS EXIST FOR FLIGHT 7
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LONG TERM CORRECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS
DETERMINE A METHOD FOR INSPECTION OF
VENDOR USING TESTING.
SUBSURFACE VOIDS AT THE
NON DESTRUCTIVE IN-HOUSE TESTING (3RD and 5TH FLIGHT GASKETS)
X-RAY
COLD DYNAMIC TESTING
• INSPECT USING PLEXIGLAS INSPECTION TOOL
• DETERMINE IF ANOMALY CAN BE DETECTED WITH COMPRESSION LOAD
OF 3600-4000 PSI (COMPLETED)
• PHOTOGRAPHS TAKEN BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER TESTING
_CORPORAPON
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LONG TERM CORRECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS (CONTINUED)
AFTER PLEXIGLAS INSPECTION, THE GASKET WILL BE GIVEN TO ADVANCED
TECHNOLOGY TO FURTHER INVESTIGATE INSPECTION TECHNIQUES
BACK SCATTER X-RAY, CATSCAN, N-RAY, SHEAROGRAPHY,
ELASTODYNAMICS (OUT OF HOUSE TESTING)
ACOUSTICAL,
• THIS WORK SHOULD HAVE TOP PRIORITY IN THE EVENT A VOID
INSPECTION IS REQUIRED PRIOR TO FLIGHT 6 (AND SUBSEQUENT)
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LONG TERM CORRECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS (CONTINUED)
DESTRUCTIVE INVESTIGATION
• RESILIENCY TESTING OF GASKET TO BE PERFORMED AT VOID AND
REGIONS AWAY FROM THE VOID
• ANALYZE INDENTATION ANOMALY AND INVESTIGATE SOURCE OF PROBLEM
• DISSECT VOID
• PERFORM LAB WORK
INFRA-RED ANALYSIS OF MATERIAL
STEREOSCOPIC MICROSCOPE INSPECTION
• OTHER
ALTERNATE SEAL DESIGN AS PART OF PRODUCT IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM
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RPRB PRESENTATION
SEALS DISASSEMBLY REPORT
06 DECEMBER 1989
K. S. BAKER
JOINTS AND SEALS DESIGN
PM: B. CROSBIE
SIE: D. PULLEYN
FP: D. STARRETT
DE: K. BAKER, L. NELSEN, A. CARLISLE, G.
QE: P. FEARNS, L° ROBISON
Rel: J. RICHARDS
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• PFARs: 360T004A-20
•DESCRIPTION:
• A small piece of flashing was found to have been
M8324811 BB leak test port plug O-ring.
• HISTORY: Not previously seen on this O-ring, but this
seen on other small O-rings.
B
molded into the I.D. of the
type of anomaly has been
•DISCUSSION:
• The BB assembly drawing calls out M8324811 O-ring as the primary call out for
the BB leak test port plug secondary seal
• The alternate call out is to use 1U50228 or 1U76145
• M8324811 O-rings are not 100% inspected, lot acceptance is how they are
received.
• 1U50228 is the current acceptable flight O-ring for all the other leak test port
plug O-rings on the motor.
• 1U76145 drawing has been canceled.
•RECOMMENDATIONS:
• TEAM CLASSIFICATION: Minor Anomaly
• JUSTIFICATION:
• This has no impact on motor performance because this is a packing seal and
it does not experience any dynamic movement during motor operation.
• CORRECTIVE ACTION:
• Short term; change assembly planning so that, were available, 1U50228
O-rings are used in the assembly of the S&A.
• Long term; remove all alternate O-rings from the three (1U52293, 294, and
295) assembly drawings and replace with the equivalent lU50228 O-ring,
except for environmental seals.
• REPORT BACK TO RPRB? No
• ACTIONEE: S&A Component Program Team
.o
IPFARs: 360H005B-29, TEM04-02
for actions 1&2.
•DESCRIPTION:
• Circumferential closed flow lines were found on two environmental seals of the
S&A, the largest measured 0.120 inch long.
• HISTORY: Not previously seen on these O-rings, but this type of anomaly has been
seen on other small O-rings.
•DISCUSSION:
• Flow lines are caused during the molding process when the material introduced
into the mold does not flow properly. Inherent to compression molding process.
• All the environmental seals in the S&A are Mil. Spec. O-rings which are not
100% inspected.
•RECOMMENDATIONS:
• TEAM CLASSIFICATION: Remains Observation
• JUSTIFICATION:
• Environmental seals are designed to keep contamination out of the S&A
under ambient conditions, flow lines on these O-rings will not impair this
function because they close up when squeezed. 0
• CORRECTIVE ACTION:
• Change Post Fire Engineering Evaluation Limits (PEEL) to say flow lines on
the S&A environmental seals are acceptable.
• REPORT BACK TO RPRB? No
• ACTIONEE: Joints and Seals Design.
• PFARs: 360L003B-14
•DESCRIPTION:
• Two open radial flow lines were found on the forward field joint leak test port
plug O-ring (lot 56). Approx. length of largest open flow line was 0.090 inch.
• HISTORY: Previously found on 1st flight center aft cyl. to cyl. factory joint.
• Presented to RPRB on 15 February 1989 with the following corrective action:
• Dedicated 16 hole mold for 1U50228-15 O-ring starting with lot 47
• Purged from stores all -15 O-rings prior to lot 47.
• All -15 O-rings from lot 56 were re-inspected, none were found any anomalies.
SEALS DISASSEMBLY REPORT
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SEALS DISASSEMBLY REPORT
•DISCUSSION:
• Flow lines are caused during the molding process when the material introduced
into the mold does not flow properly. Inherent to compression molding process.
•RECOMMENDATIONS:
• TEAM CLASSIFICATION: Minor Anomaly
• JUSTIFICATION:
• This has no impact on motor performance because this is a packing seal and
it does not experience any dynamic movement during motor operation.
• CORRECTIVE ACTION:
• Implement the use the new base line O-ring material, STW4-3339.
• Implement new acceptance criteria for small O-rings, STW3-3744.
• Implement a dedicated O-ring molding area at the vendor
• Write a memo to inspection personnel to alert them to this type of problem.
• REPORT BACK TO RPRB? yes
• ACTIONEE:
_ CORPORATION
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actions 1-3, Quality Engineering
SEALS DISASSEMBLY REPORT (Cont.)
for action 4.
• PFARs: 360L006A-34
•DESCRIPTION:
• A closed radial flow line was found on the 18 degree Sll secondary O-ring of
the LH motor.
• HISTORY: Closed flow lines have previously found small O-ring but not on this
particular part number.
•DISCUSSION:
• This particular O-ring (1U52296) is not inspected to 1U50228 criteria.
• Flow lines are caused during the molding process when the material introduced
into the mold does not flow properly. Inherent to compression molding process.
•RECOMMENDATIONS:
• TEAM CLASSIFICATION:
• JUSTIFICATION:
'7_-_-d_ CORPORATKTN
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SEALS DISASSEMBLY REPORT (Cont.)
• This joint does not experience any dynamic
• This O-ring is leak tested at 50 psig which
that would not seal during motor operation.
movement, i.e. gap growth.
is designed to find O-ring flaws
• CORRECTIVE ACTION:
• Re-inspect all in-house 1U52296 O-rings to 1U50228 criteria.
• Procure equivalent 1U50228 O-rings (-38).
• Change assembly drawing to call out the 1U50228-38 O-ring (same
action as PFAR 360T004A-20).
corrective
• REPORT BACK TO RPRB?
• ACTIONEE: Quality Engineering for action 1, O-ring Component Program Team
for action 2, S&A Component Program Team for action 3.
• PFARs: 360H005B-19
•DESCRIPTION:
• A small void was found in the O.D. of the S&A leak test port plug O-ring
(1U50228-25, lot 19), measures approx. 0.05 inch in clrcumferentlal length by
"__'_---4_ CORPORATRTN
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0.015 inch wide radially by 0.003 inch deep
• HISTORY: Not previously seen.
,DISCUSSION:
• Most probable cause is; the void was caused during the molding process.
• The material does not flow properly and causes trapped air pockets or
no-fill areas before complete gland fill.
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•RECOMMENDATIONS:
• TEAM CLASSIFICATION: Minor Anomaly
• JUSTIFICATION:
• This has no impact on motor performance because this is a packing seal and
it does not experience any dynamic movement during motor operation.
• CORRECTIVE ACTION:
• Write a memo to inspection personnel to alert them to this type of problem.
• Implement actions 2-4 of PFAR 360L003B-14
• REPORT BACK TO RPRB?
• ACTIONEE: Quality Engineering for
for action 2.
• PFARs: 360L006A-23, 360L006B-24
action 1, O-ring Component Program Team
•DESCRIPTION:
• The LH outer gasket
_ CORPORATION
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SEALS DISASSEMBLY REPORT (Cont.)
around the edge of the retainer, largest separation measured approx. 2 inches
long.
• The RH outer gasket environmental seal was sheared off the edge of the
retainer from 175 to 320 degrees.
REFERENCE: PFAR TEM02-01
• HISTORY: Previously found on TEM-02 and TPTA 2.3, presented to RPRB on 28 July
1989.
• Recommendations from PFAR TEM02-01 have been incorporated into the
baseline manufacturing plan at the vendor.
• Limits for acceptable damage to the environmental seal have been added to the
PEEL, effective seventh flight.
•DISCUSSION:
• This damage is probably the result of a combination of factors, they being:
• Reuse of Gaskets, all four damaged environmental seals were on reused
gaskets.
• Long range program plan is to not refuse gaskets.
• Possible contamination of the bondline with xylene primer (part of the cause
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of the TEM-02 problem).
• When a load is applied to the igniter adapter, during bolt pre-loading,, a
shearing action is applied to the seal at the O.D. of the gasket retainer.
•RECOMMENDATIONS:
• TEAM CLASSIFICATION: Minor Anomaly
• JUSTIFICATION:
• Even with the missing portion of the seal, their is still a portion
still bonded to the lip of the retainer. With the remaining portion
the part still functions as intended.
of the seal
of the seal,
• CORRECTIVE ACTION:
• Close this PFAR.
• REPORT BACK TO RPRB? no
• ACTIONEE: Joints and
• PFARs: 360L006B-33
Seals Design.
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•DESCRIPTION:
• Of the 100 packing with retainers from the RH motor, three had closed flow
lines and three had open flow lines.
REFERENCE: PFAR QM8-04
• HISTORY: First found on QM-8 and presented to RPRB on 8 March 1989 as a major
anomaly.
• Presented to EMT for third flight as remains observation.
• Corrective action from QM-8 had a flight effectivity of 6B.
• All motors previous to 6B have been classified as remains observation.
•DISCUSSION:
• Flow lines are caused during the molding process when the material introduced
into the mold does not flow properly. Inherent to compression molding process.
• MIL-STD-413 is the current inspection criteria for packing with retainers.
• This standard was clarified and implemented for 6B.
•RECOMMENDATIONS:
• TEAM CLASSIFICATION:
"___ CORPORATtON
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SEALS DISASSEMBLY REPORT (Cont.)
• JUSTIFICATION:
• Testing done on packing with retainers with open flow lines from QM-8, has
shown that they functioned as designed even with open flow lines.
• CORRECTIVE ACTION:
• Write a memo to Inspection personnel to alert them to this type of problem.
• Release packing with retainer acceptance specification (STW3-3780)
• ECP-1974 in review at MSFC.
• Close this PFAR if no flow lines are found the seventh flight packing with
retainers.
• REPORT BACK TO RPRB? yes, give results of seventh flight assessment.
• ACTIONEE: Quality Engineering for action 1, Joints and Seals Design for action
2.
• PFARs: 360L006A-32
•DESCRIPTION:
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• The secondary O-ring of dual seal plug that was used to
pressure port had a I.D. cut, full circumference.
• HISTORY: Not previously seen.
,DISCUSSION:
plug the igniter
• Most likely cause of this cut is from over fill of the dove tail groove on the
dual seal plug.
• Measurements of the O-ring, show it to be nominal size.
• Actual plug was scraped during igniter adapter refurb.
• This lot of plugs had a DR written against them for the dove tail groove
being to shallow.
• Removal of plug required approximately the same torque to remove as the
comparable part in the RH motor.
• Plug is lock wired in place.
• RECOMMENDATIONS: Classification and corrective actions will be determined by the
Component Program Team.
_ CORPORATION
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JOINTS AND SEALS DESIGN
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OVERVIEW: CLASSIFICATION
1- Copper particles on rotor shaft secondary O-rings
2- Axial scratches across housing bore sealing surfaces
3- Axial scratch on rotor shaft secondary O-ring groove
4- Lack of/excess grease on leak test plug
5- Galling on leak test plug shoulder seal surface
6- Radial scratch across leak test plug seal surface
7- Chipped thread on leak test plug
8- Circ. scratch on shoulder seal surface of leak test
9- Contamination on shoulder seal surface of SII port
10- NSI/SII thread continuation into shoulder seal surface
11- Radial scratch across shoulder seal surface of SII port
12- Deformation in sealing washer of Sll
13- Radial scratch across sealing washer of SII
14- Radial scratch across Sll port secondary O-ring groove
Minor Anomaly
Minor Anomaly
Minor Anomaly
Minor Anomaly
Minor Anomaly
Minor Anomaly
Minor Anomaly
port Minor Anomaly
Remains observation
Minor Anomaly
Minor Anomaly
Minor Anomaly
Minor Anomaly
Minor Anomaly
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• PFARs: 360H005B-16, 360L006A-15, 360L006B-16
• DESCRIPTION:
Small copper particles were found on the high pressure side of the rotor
shaft secondary O-rings. Lab analysis confirmed the particles to be
copper.
HISTORY: First found on the 5B Barrier Booster. Similar particles were found
on B-B's from 6A, and 6B. No contamination was found on 7A or 7B.
DISCUSSION:
• The copper particles have only been found on the high pressure side
the rotor shaft secondary O-ring.
of
The copper is being introduced into the leak test cavity in the rotor
housing bore during the high pressure leak test at the vendor, Eaton
Valve and Actuator Division (E-VAD).
A copper Conoseal is used in the connection between the pressure
line and the leak test port adapter. Conoseals from the line were
inspected and found to be flaking under use.
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• DISCUSSION (cont.)
The copper particles come in contact with the secondary O-rings when
the rotor shaft is removed from the housing bore; the O-rings wipe the
grease and copper from the bore as it passes through.
• RECOMMENDATIONS:
TEAM CLASSIFICATION: Minor Anomaly
JUSTIFICATION:
• Violates engineering and requires corrective action.
• Has no impact on motor performance because:
The rotor shaft is installed into the housing bore before leak
testing is performed,
The rotor shaft seals passed two high pressure and one low
pressure leak test.
__'__CORPORATION
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CORRECTIVE ACTION:
Short term: Add E-VAD planning change to blow the pressure line
clean prior to each hook-up.
Implement an in-line filter in the leak test equipment to
prevent any contamination from entering the bore.
Effective: 19 January 1990.
Long term: Modify the 8U leak test equipment to replace all copper
fittings.
REPORT BACK TO RPRB? No
ACTIONEE: S&A Component Team for short term, Joints and Seals
Design for long term.
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PFARs: 360T004A-18, 360T004B-19, 360H005A-14, 360H005B-15, TEM04-11,
LAT41-04
• DESCRIPTION:
Several axial scratches were found across the B-B rotor shaft housing
bore primary and secondary seal surfaces. The scratches vary in length
and have a maximum depth of approximately 0.4 mils.
HISTORY: No history of scratches in the housing bore previous to 360T004 have
been reported.
DISCUSSION:
The housing bore is made of soft material (304 Stainless) and is easily
scratched.
The most probable cause of the scratches is the bore measurement
inspection tool.
• Up to Sixth Flight, E-VAD's planning did not require inspection of the
bore after bore measurement.
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• DISCUSSION (cont.)
The refurbishment specification, STW7-3133, does not specifically call
out inspection point for the housing bore.
• RECOMMENDATIONS:
TEAM CLASSIFICATION: Minor Anomaly
JUSTIFICATION:
• Violates engineering and requires corrective action.
B-B's with scratched bores have passed the high and low pressure
leak tests.
• Post-fire inspection found no damage to the rotor shaft O-rings.
CORRECTIVE ACTION:
Short Term: Modify vendor planning to inspect all B-B rotor housing
bore seal surfaces for damage prior to rotor installation.
"__CORPORATION
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CORRECTIVE ACTION (cont.)
• Short Term:
• OCR
Long Term:
micrometer.
implemented-
Replace bore
Effective: Sixth Flight.
measurement inspection tool with air
Update refurbishment specification, STW7-3133, to incorporate better
seal surface definitions and inspection points.
REPORT BACK TO RPRB? No
ACTIONEE: S&A Component Team and Joints and Seals Design.
_ CORPORATION
SPACE OPERATIONS
INFORMATION ON THIS PAGE WAS PREPARED TO SUPPORT AN ORAL PRESENTATION
AND CANNOT BE CONSIDERED COMPt.EIE WITHOUT THE ORAL DISCUSSION
7
S&A DISASSEMBLY REPORT
• PFARs: TEM04-03
• DESCRIPTION:
Small axial scratch found on B-B rotor shaft secondary O-ring groove;
approximate length was 30 mils.
• HISTORY: Not previously reported.
• DISCUSSION:
Occurrence unknown; scratch probably occurred at O-ring removal during
refurbishment.
• RECOMMENDATIONS:
• TEAM CLASSIFICATION:
JUSTIFICATION:
Minor Anomaly
• Violates engineering and requires corrective action.
• The rotor shaft seals passed both high and low pressure leak tests.
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JUSTIFICATION (cont.):
• No rotor shaft O-ring damage has been found due to
h .... .'..-- ,------ _-oto_ s_,_4 o-_," 7 _,-oo._%,lu_ml I_ IJ_P I _.0 ;"
scratches in the
CORRECTIVE ACTION"
Short Term: Clarify inspection point of the rotor shaft O-ring groove
seal surfaces in vendor (E-VAD) planning.
Implement non-metallic O-ring removal tool in all places that
require removal of O-rings. Effective: 19 January 1990
Long Term: Update refurbishment specification, STW7-3133, to
incorporate better seal surface definitions and inspection points.
REPORT BACK TO RPRB? No
ACTIONEE: S&A Component Team and Joints and Seals Design.
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PFARs: 360L001A-48,
TEM04-04, LAT41-02
DESCRIPTION:
360L003B-15, 360H005A-17, 360H005B-18, 360H005B-31,
• Lack of/excess grease found on S&A leak test (MS9902-01) plugs.
HISTORY: First, Third, and
DISCUSSION:
Fifth Flights, TEM-04, and LAT-41.
Thiokol planning does not specify amount of grease to be applied to B-B
leak test plug or O-ring.
KSC planning (OMI) did
S&A-to-adapter leak test
not require grease application to the
plug or O-ring prior to Sixth Flight.
• OMI update for proper grease application effective Sixth Flight.
Grease is used as a lubricant for the O-ring; a lack of grease could
damage the O-ring upon assembly and excess grease could cause an
overfill condition and result in O-ring extrusion damage.
_7--_CORPORATION
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• RECOMMENDATIONS:
TEAM CLASSIFICATION: Minor Anomaly
JUSTIFICATION:
• Potential for O-ring damage.
Corrective action is required.
No O-ring damage has been found due to a lack of or excessive
grease on the MS9902-01 leak test plug.
CORRECTIVE ACTION:
Short Term: Update Thiokol planning to quantify grease application to
the leak test plugs and O-rings. Effective: 19 January 1990
_--__ CORPORATION
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CORRECTIVE ACTION (cont.):
Long Term: Implement TRACS at Thiokol and KSC for proper grease
application techniques and update the grease spec to incorporate
small O-rings.
• Add limits to PEEL stating lack of/excessive grease is reportable.
Modify grease specification, STW7-2999, to incorporate small O-ring
grease application.
REPORT BACK TO RPRB? No
ACTIONEE: Joints and Seals Design and Final Assembly Work Center.
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PFARs: 360T004B-25, 360L006A-31, 360L006B-32, 360L007A-19, 360L007B-20,
TEM04-06, LAT41-03
• DESCRIPTION"
Circumferential galling was found on the shoulder seal surface of the
S&A-to-adapter and B-B bore leak test (MS9902-01) plugs. The width
length of the galled region varies.
and
• HISTORY: Not previously reported.
• DISCUSSION:
Galling on the plug occurs during the machining process of the seal
surface on the plug.
The leak test plugs are inspected and installed into
They are removed prior to leak test and re-installed
and at KSC (flange).
the B-B at E-VAD.
on plant (B-B bore)
Thiokol assembly planning does not call out inspection of the B-B bore
leak test plug prior to re-installation.
"_7"_ CORPORATION
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• RECOMMENDATIONS:
TEAM CLASSIFICATION: Minor Anomaly
JUSTIFICATION'.
• Violates surface finish and requires corrective action.
• Shoulder seal is a packing rather than a face seal.
• Galled surface does not extend across the full O-ring footprint.
No O-ring damage has been found due to galled shoulder seal
surface of leak test plug.
CORRECTIVE ACTION:
Short Term: Inspect all MS9902-01 plugs in Stores and at E-VAD per
MS9902 specification and reject those that are unacceptable.
Effective: 19 January 1990.
T__--_ CORPORATION
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CORRECTIVE ACTION (cont.):
Long Term: Replace MS9902-01 plug with 1U50159 leak test plug;
1U50159 plugs are 100 percent inspected and controlled in-house.
REPORT BACK TO RPRB? No
ACTIONEE: Quality Engineering for short term and S&A Component Team
for long term.
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• PFARs: LAT41-01, TEM04-05.
• DESCRIPTION:
A single radial scratch was found across the shoulder seal surface of the
S&A-to-adapter and B-B bore leak test (MS9902-01) plugs.
• HISTORY: Previously found on Second and Third Flights.
• DISCUSSION:
The assembly/leak test procedure for the S&A requires that the leak test
plug be removed from the port prior to leak test of the seals. The old
O-ring is to be removed from the plug. A new O-ring is to be installed
onto the plug prior to plug re-installation.
Up to, but not including Fifth Flight, the tool used to remove the
O-rings was causing the scratch across the seal surface of the plug.
Inspection of the seal surface was not being properly
performed prior to plug re-installation.
T,#_(_C-4_ CORPORATION
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• DISCUSSION (cont.):
PFAR's from Second and Third Flights were closed out by updating
planning and using non-metallic removal tool for O-rings.
• Corrective action became effective for Fifth Flight.
• RECOMMENDATIONS:
TEAM CLASSIFICATION: Minor Anomaly
JUSTIFICATION:
• Violates PEEL; assembly metal damage is reportable.
• No O-ring damage has been found due to scratch on plug.
• Shoulder O-ring is a packing seal.
High installation torque ensures metal-to-metal seating of plug to port
spotface.
SPACE OPERATIONS
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CORRECTIVE ACTION:
SHORT TERM: Modify vendor and Thiokol planning to properly
inspect leak test plug seal surface prior to plug installation.
Effective: 19 January 1990.
REPORT BACK TO RPRB? No
ACTIONEE: Quality Engineering and Joints and Seals Design
_--_O___CORPORAgON
SPACE OPERATIONS
INFORMAlION ON THIS PAGE WAS PREPARED TO SUP?ORT AN ORAL PRESENTATION
AND CAI'JNOT 8E CONSIDERED COMPt.ETE WITHOUT THE ORAL OISCUSSION
18
S&A DISASSEMBLY REPORT
• PFARs: 360LO06A-21
• DESCRIPTION:
The last thread of the S&A-to-adapter and B-B bore leak test (MS9902-01)
plugs was chipped.
• HISTORY: Not previously reported.
• DISCUSSION:
The thread becomes chipped during the machining process; a portion of
the thread shears off.
The MS9902-01 leak test plugs are lot accepted.
The chipped thread could damage the O-ring upon assembly.
• The Thiokol assembly planning does not require the use of a thread
protector to install the O-ring onto the plug.
_ CORPORATION
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• RECOMMENDATIONS:
TEAM CLASSIFICATION: Minor Anomaly
JUSTIFICATION:
This is the first time a chipped thread on a (MS9902) leak test plug
has been reported.
• Requires corrective action.
• No O-ring damage has been found due to chipped thread.
CORRECTIVE ACTION:
Short Term: Inspect all MS9902-01 plugs in Stores and at E-VAD
MS9902 specification and reject those that are unacceptable.
• Implement thread protector. Effective: 19 January 1990.
per
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CORRECTIVE ACTION (cont.)
Long Term: Replace MS9902-01 plug with 1U50159 leak test plug;
1U50159 plugs are 100 percent inspected and controlled in-house.
• Add PEEL criteria stating chipped threads are reportable.
REPORT BACK TO RPRB? No
ACTIONEE: Quality Engineering for short term and S&A Component Team
for long term.
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• PFARs: 360L007A-22, 360L007B-23
• DESCRIPTION:
A single circumferential scratch was found on the shoulder seal area of
the S&A-to-adapter and B-B bore leak test ports.
• HISTORY: Not previously reported.
DISCUSSION:
The scratch occurred prior to
visible with good lighting and
Thiokol assembly planning does not call out an inspection
B-B bore leak test plug port seal surfaces.
The Barrier Booster refurbishment specification
allow any seal surface defects.
leak test plug installation. The scratch is
should have been found during inspection.
point for the
(STW7-3133) does not
_CORPORATION
SPACE OPERATIONS
INFORMATION ON THIS PAGE WAS PREPARED TO SUPPORT AN ORAL PRESENTATION
AND CANNOT BE CONSIOERED COMPLETE WIIHOUT THE ORAL OISCUSSION
22
S&A DISASSEMBLY REPORT
• RECOMMENDATIONS:
TEAM CLASSIFICATION: Minor Anomaly
JUSTIFICATION:
• Violates engineering and requires corrective action.
The scratch is in the circumferential direction and does not cross the
O-ring footprint.
The shoulder O-ring is a packing seal.
No O-ring damage has been found due to scratch in leak test port.
CORRECTIVE ACTION:
Short Term: Update Thiokol assembly planning and vendor refurb
planning to perform detailed inspection of all port seal surfaces.
Effective: 19 January 1990.
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CORRECTIVE ACTION (cont.):
Long Term: Modify refurbishment specification, STW7-3133, to
incorporate better seal surface definitions and inspection points.
REPORT BACK TO RPRB? No
ACTIONEE: S&A Component Team and Joints and Seals Design.
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• PFARs: 360L006A-31, 360L007B-21
• DESCRIPTION:
A black substance was found in the grease on the primary seal surface
of the SII port.
• HISTORY: Not previously reported.
• DISCUSSION:
Lab analysis identified black substance as combustion products from SII.
Source of contamination was found to be introduced during removal of
the SII at disassembly.
Combustion products in the sooted tip of the SII rubbed off into the
grease as the SII was removed.
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• RECOMMENDATIONS:
• TEAM CLASSIFICATION: Remains observation.
JUSTIFICATION:
• Non-problem and does not require corrective action.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
• Close PFARs.
T_CORPORATION
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• PFARs: 360L006A-19, 360L006B-20, TEM04-08, TEM04-10
• DESCRIPTION:
• NSI/SII thread was found to continue into the primary seal surface.
• HISTORY: Previously found on NSI/SII's all the way back into the SRM program.
II DISCUSSION:
• The NSI/SII is a NASA controlled part; the drawing does not control the
thread termination point.
An industry alert was submitted in January 1989 stating that the
threads may possibly continue up to the body and leave no viable
seal surface. A recommendation for a specification change was made.
The alert was stopped by NASA.
• RECOMMENDATIONS:
TEAM CLASSIFICATION: Minor Anomaly
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JUSTIFICATION:
• Potential to violate seal surface and requires corrective action.
No history of thread continuation past O-ring footprint; two other seal
surfaces remain.
• SIl's are low pressure leak tested; no leaks were detected.
No primary O-ring damage has been found due to thread
continuation.
CORRECTIVE ACTION:
• Short Term: Inspect all Sll's in Stores for continuation of threads.
Update planning to inspect for continuation of threads into
seal surface prior to installation.
Effective: 19 January 1990.
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CORRECTIVE ACTION (cont.):
Long Term: Recommend and submit engineering changes for a
unibody SII, including industry standard thread relief, to NASA.
• Add PEEL limits stating threads continuing into seal surface is
reportable.
REPORT BACK TO RPRB? No
ACTIONEE: S&A Component Team and Joints and Seals Design.
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• PFARs: 360L006A-27, 360L006B-28
DESCRIPTION:
• A single radial scratch was
surface of the SII port.
found across the primary (shoulder) seal
• HISTORY: Not previously reported.
DISCUSSION:
The
good lighting and should
scratch occurred prior to SII installation. The
have been found during
Thiokol assembly planning
SII port seal surfaces.
does not call out an
The Barrier Booster refurbishment specification
allow primary seal surface defects.
scratch is visible with
inspection.
inspection point for the
(STW7-3133) does not
• RECOMMENDATIONS:
TEAM CLASSIFICATION: Minor Anomaly
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JUSTIFICATION:
• Violates engineering and requires corrective action.
• The Sll's are low pressure leak tested; no leaks were detected.
The primary O-ring is a packing seal.
• Evidence of soot to the primary O-ring has not been reported.
• INo O-ring damage
CORRECTIVE ACTION:
Short Term:
planning to
Effective: 19
has been found due to scratch in port.
Update Thiokol
include detailed
January 1990.
assembly planning and vendor refurb
inspection of all port seal surfaces.
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CORRECTIVE ACTION (cont.):
II Long Term: Update refurbishment specification, STW7-3133, to
incorporate better seal surface definitions and inspection points.
• Incorporate test plan to evaluate the SII leak test.
REPORT BACK TO RPRB? No
ACTIONEE: S&A Component Team and Joints and Seals Design.'
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PFARs: 360H005A-22, 360H005A-23, 360H005B-24, 360H005B-25, 360L006A-17,
360L006B-18, 360L007A-15, 360L007B-16, TEM04-07, TEM04-08
• DESCRIPTION:
Several deformations were found in the sealing washer on the SIl's. The
deformations are circumferential and follow the pattern of the NSI. The
largest deformations, located over the wrench slots, are approximately 3
mils deep.
HISTORY: Previously found at post-fire inspection since TEM-04. Deformations
have been noticed since SII Lot HWD and subsequent.
• DISCUSSION:
The NSI/Sll is a government furnished part.
The SII is created by welding a back-up ring to the NSI which
provides a secondary seal surface. A sealing washer is then welded
on to provide the actual seal surface and to compensate for
irregularity in the NSI/back-up ring interface.
• The washer is deformed during manufacturing process.
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•RECOMMENDATIONS:
TEAM CLASSIFICATION: Minor Anomaly
JUSTIFICATION:
• Potential to violate O-ring squeeze and requires corrective action.
Deformation does not completely compromise secondary O-ring
footprint.
• The SIl's are low pressure leak tested; no leaks were detected.
CORRECTIVE ACTION:
Short Term: Investigate engineering accept/reject criteria of
deformations.
Add inspection point during acceptance to screen out-of-tolerance
deformations. Effective: 19 January 1990.
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CORRECTIVE ACTION (cont.):
• Long Term: Recommend and submit engineering changes to NASA for
a unibody construction for the SII.
Add PEEL limits stating that deformations in sealing washer are
reportable.
Evaluate new design for larger secondary O-ring and groove for
higher squeeze.
• Incorporate test plan to evaluate the SII leak test.
REPORT BACK TO RPRB? Yes
ACTIONEE: NASA, S&A Component Team, and Joints and Seals Design.
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• PFARs: 360L006A-25, 360L007B-18
• DESCRIPTION:
A single radial scratch was found across the sealing washer of the SII.
The maximum depth of the worst case scratch was less than 1.0 mil.
• HISTORY: Not previously reported.
• DISCUSSION:
Thiokol assembly planning has an inspection point to verify no damage to
the SIl's: no scratches, nicks, dings, etc.
• The scratches occur prior to SII assembly; source is unknown.
• RECOMMENDATIONS:
TEAM CLASSIFICATION: Minor Anomaly
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JUSTIFICATION:
• First time occurrence, is reportable, and requires corrective action.
The SIl's are low pressure leak tested; no leaks were detected.
No secondary O-ring damage has been found due to the scratch
across the seal washer.
CORRECTIVE ACTION:
Short Term: Update Thiokol assembly log to include detailed
inspection of SII seal surfaces; replace those that are unacceptable.
Effective: 19 January 1990.
Long Term: Recommend and submit engineering changes to NASA for
unibody SII.
• Incorporate test plan to evaluate the SII leak test.
REPORT BACK TO RPRB? No
• ACTIONEE: S&A Component Team, Joints and Seals Design, and NASA.
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• PFARs: 360L006A-26, 360L007A-17
• DESCRIPTION:
A single radial scratch was found across the bottom of the Sll secondary
O-ring groove.
• HISTORY: Not previously reported.
• DISCUSSION:
The scratch occurred prior to SII installation. The scratch is visible in
good lighting and should not have been missed during inspection.
Thiokol assembly planning does not call out an inspection point for the
SII port seal surfaces.
The Barrier Booster refurbishment specification (STW7-3133) does not
allow secondary seal surface defects in ports.
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• RECOMMENDATIONS:
TEAM CLASSIFICATION: Minor Anomaly
JUSTIFICATION:
• Violates engineering and requires corrective action.
• The Sll's are low pressure leak tested; no leaks were detected.
No primary O-ring damage has been found due to scratch in shoulder
seal surface of port.
CORRECTIVE ACTION:
Short Term: Update Thiokol assembly planning
planning to perform detailed inspection of all
Effective: 19 January 1990.
and vendor refurb
port seal surfaces.
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CORRECTIVE ACTION (cont.):
Long Term: Update refurbishment specification, STW7-3133, to
incorporate better seal surface definitions and inspection points.
• Incorporate test plan to evaluate the SII leak test.
REPORT BACK TO RPRB? No
ACTIONEE: S&A Component Team and Joints and Seals Design.
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• PFARs: 360L003A-20, 360L003B-21, 360T004A-22, 360T004B-23,
360H005A-27, 360H005B-28, 360L006A-35, 360L006B-36
• DESCRIPTION:
• No grease on port, plug, and O-ring
• HISTORY:
Similar problems previously reported to RPRB
on 18 April 1989
• Corrective actions implemented:
Planning has been updated to
greasing, but will not become
until 10th flight.
include
totally effective
Drawings have been changed to call out the
proper installation specification.
• Previously classified as Minor Anomaly
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= RECOMMENDATIONS:
• TEAM CLASSIFICATION:
JUSTIFICATION:
Minor Anomaly
Violates engineering, does not require any new
corrective action, and has no impact on motor
performance because:
• The O-ring will seal properly with no grease
• The plugs are verified to be flush with the case
Does not reduce usability of plug for its intended
function.
• CLOSE ALL PFARs
• CORRECTIVE ACTION: Already implemented, no additional
action required.
• REPORT BACK TO RPRB? No
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PFARs: 360L001B-50, 360L002A-34, 360L002A-35, 360L002B-33,
360L003A-18, 360L003B-19, 360T004A-26, 360T004B-20,
360L004B-21,360L005A-23, 360L005B-24, 360L006B-24,
360L007A-28
DESCRIPTION:
• Rolled threads on last partial
1U100269 leak check plugs
thread of 1U51475 &
• HISTORY:
Occurred on RSRM-1, and RSRM-2 for the 1U100269 plug
and was reported to RPRB on 1 March 1989.
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• Corrective actions (Completed) were to:
• Inspect plugs in house for rolled threads
Discuss problems with the vendor to correct
the problems on future hardware.
Release ECO to prohibit rolled threads
Complete the implementation of O-ring installation
aid and plug thread inspection in Shop Planning
DISCUSSION:
O-ring cannot be damaged during assembly because
it is assembled over the O-ring installation aid.
Once installed, the O-ring will not contact the
threads of the plugs.
During disassembly, the O-ring is typically cut
on the inner diameter as the plug rotates out.
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• RECOMMENDATIONS:
• TEAM CLASSIFICATION: Remains Observation
• JUSTIFICATION:
This problem does not require any new corrective
action.
• The O-ring will not be damaged on assembly.
• This will not affect the installation of the plug
CORRECTIVE ACTION: Joints and Seals/Post Fire Evaluation
to update the peel document to allow
this situation on disassembly.
• CLOSE PFARs
• REPORT BACK TO RPRB? No
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• PFARs: 360H005B-25, 360L006B-22, 360L007A-27
• DESCRIPTION:
• Radial scratches on the secondary seal surface of leak
check plugs (1U51475 & 1U100269)
DISCUSSION
Source of the scratch is believed to be handling damage
after the inspection of the plugs.
• The 1U51475-01 plugs are made from a 1U100269-01 plug.
A baseline now controls the handling
the 1U100269 plugs.
and processing of
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• RECOMMENDATIONS
• TEAM CLASSIFICATION:
JUSTIFICATION:
Minor Anomaly
• Violates engineering and requires corrective action.
= Potential leak path
• Potential damage to O-ring, causing leak path
• CORRECTIVE ACTION: Program Management to write an AO
to inspect plugs in house for this
defect that were made after the
last inspection, and before the
baseline was established. Quality
Engineering to write the planning
for this inspection. Quality
Engineering to take steps to prevent
future occurances of this problem.
• REPORT BACK TO RPRB? No
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• PFARs: 360H005A-26
• DESCRIPTION:
Circumferential
vent port plug
DISCUSSION:
scratch on dovetail
(1U76425)
of adjustable
• The scratch is a machining mark.
• HISTORY
• First occurrence of this problem
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RECOMMENDATIONS
• TEAM CLASSIFICATION:
JUSTIFICATION:
Minor Anomaly
Violates engineering and requires corrective
action.
Scratch is circumferential, and does not
go across the footprint of the O-ring.
The O-ring in this area is a packing seal,
and will tolerate this type of defect.
• The O-rings of this plug are leak tested.
Circumferential tooling marks are allowed
on the mating surface.
• No structural concerns
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CORRECTIVE ACTION: Quality Engineering to train
inspectors to find this problem.
REPORT BACK TO RPRB? No
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• PFARs: 360H005B-32
• DESCRIPTION:
Raised metal in the first internal thread of
the Adjustable Vent Port Plug (1U76425-03).
DISCUSSION:
The raised metal is believed to have been caused
by slightly cross threading either the leak test
adapter or Closure Plug into these threads.
• HISTORY
• First occurrence of this problem
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RECOMMENDATIONS
., TEAM CLASSIFICATION:
JUSTIFICATION:
Minor Anomaly
The Closure Plug is verified to be flush
at installation.
Running and final torque values controlled
Threads are inspected prior to installation
of the Closure Plug.
• CORRECTIVE ACTION: Quality Engineering to train
inspectors to find this problem.
• REPORT BACK TO RPRB? No
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